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I. INTRODUCTION
On occasion, a fact pattern will arise in a tort action where a con-
current omission by two negligent defendants has brought about a sit-
uation causing injury to an innocent plaintiff.1 For example,
defendant X, a rental agency, negligently fails to discover or repair a
required safety device such as automobile brakes, and defendant Y, a
driver, while using the instrumentality, subsequently fails to use the
safety device at all, causing injury to the plaintiff.2 When this hap-
pens, the element of causation must be carefully analyzed because it is
possible that both defendants could be exonerated, leaving the plain-
tiff without redress.
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REvw.
* Amy J. Vyhlidal; B-A. University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1994; J.D., University of
Nebraska College of Law, 2001; Managing Editor, Nebraska Law Review.
1. I had the pleasure of researching this very fact pattern during the summer of
1999 for Professor Harvey Perlman to assist him in his responsibilities as co-
reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIn) OF TORT. I thank him for his patience and
his interest in my own discovery of this area of Tort law.
2. See David Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 Txx. L. RNT. 1765
(1997) (using this illustration as an example of concurrent omission to guide his
own analysis).
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Normally, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the causal link
between the defendant's wrongful conduct and plaintiffs injuries by a
preponderance of the evidence. In the particular situation previously
described, the plaintiff is able to show that the resultant injuries
would have occurred. However, both defendants might be able to es-
cape liability. The traditional premise of "but for" is inconclusive as to
each defendant.3 The rental agency, X, will say that even if they had
provided a safe vehicle, defendant Y's negligence in failing to apply the
brakes would still have caused the injuries. Likewise, the driver, Y,
will say that even if they had attempted to properly apply the brakes,
the brakes would have failed, due to X's negligence in not discovering
or fixing the brake deficiency, and the injuries would have occurred.
Under such analysis both defendants technically are exonerated of all
liability.
The language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is not helpful in
assigning liability either. Using the Restatement, one must decide if
each omission was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the injury.
4
However, the term "substantial factor," which has come to mean many
things to the courts, may prove confusing to a jury, and its application
has been inconsistent in case law.5
An instance in case law that may provide insight into this narrow
issue of causation is found in product liability/failure to warn cases.
Haag v. Bongers,6 a case recently decided by the Nebraska Supreme
Court, provides a look into a situation where causation could have
been discussed, even though the case was decided on different
grounds. In Haag, the question of how to analyze the issue of causa-
tion and the issue of where the burden of proof lies may be determina-
tive of where liability falls.7 But, even though the failure to warn
cases provide insight into this narrowly defined area, they cannot pro-
3. The traditional test for finding causation is the "but for" or sine qua non test:
defendant's negligence is a cause in fact of an injury where the injury would not
have occurred but for defendant's negligent conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
5. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 1776. Robertson identifies three inconsistent ap-
plications of the "substantial factor" test derived from the RESTATEMNT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 432(1) to (2) and §§ 431, 433: (1) as a substitute for the but-for test in
a limited category of cases in which "two causes concur to bring about an event,
and either cause, operating alone, would have brought about the event absent the
other cause."; (2) as a test more or less interchangeable with the but-for test
whenever the but-for test is proving difficult to work with for whatever reason;
and (3) as an approach to the issue of legal causation or ambit of duty. See also
Magee v. Coats, 598 So. 2d 531, 536 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Leueune v. All-
state Ins. Co., 365 So. 2d 471, 476-77 (La. 1978)).
6. 256 Neb. 170, 589 N.W.2d 318 (1999).
7. See infra Part II.
[Vol. 78:925
CONCURRENT OMISSION
vide the answers, and stand only as an example of how courts analyze
this particular fact pattern and where the tendencies currently fall.
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate how the academics and
the courts choose to deal with concurrent omissions that prevent an
innocent plaintiff from meeting the burden of proof on causation. Pro-
viding insight into how these situations could best be handled in the
future relies on the foundation of policy concerns that arise in the con-
text of concurrent omission cases. Whether to exonerate one negligent
defendant because another individual has also acted negligently in the
same set of circumstances is ultimately a question of policy.
II. WHAT DID NEBRASKA DO?-HAAG V. BONGERS
Recently in Nebraska, a strict liability/failure to warn case found
its way to the Supreme Court. The case demonstrates an application
of the concurrent omission analysis set forth previously. Haag v.
Bongers involved an injured plaintiff who sued several defendants fol-
lowing an injury occurring during an auction.8
The plaintiff was a patron and bidder at an estate auction held
near David City, Nebraska. Part of the estate consisted of a number of
antique cars. Due to the cold weather, indoor accommodations for all
bidders were provided. The auction was held in a building, open at
both ends, so the cars could be towed through. After the sale of one
particular antique Studebaker truck, the auction assistants at-
tempted to tow the truck out of the building. They experienced diffi-
culty. The hitch ball detached from the drawbar of the tractor, flew off
the tractor, and hit the plaintiff in the head causing serious injuries. 9
The evidence showed that the drawbar on the tractor was double the
size normally found on that type of tractor and that all threads on the
shank of the hitch ball had not been engaged. The plaintiff sued the
estate that held the auction, the two auctioneer companies that facili-
tated the day's events, and Putnam, the manufacturer of the hitch
ball.1o
The plaintiff alleged, among several other things, that the estate
and the auctioneers were negligent because their assistants did not
properly affix the hitch ball. The plaintiff also alleged that Putnam
was strictly liable for the plaintiffs injuries for failing to provide suffi-
cient warnings and instructions on the hitch ball."1
At trial, experts testified as to the cause of injury, the alleged mis-
use of the hitch ball, the foreseeability of that misuse, and whether the
8. See Haag v. Bongers, 256 Neb. 170, 589 N.W.2d 318 (1999).
9. Id. at 175, 589 N.W.2d at 324.
10. Id.
11. Id at 175-76, 589 N.W.2d at 324-25.
1999]
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hitch ball was unreasonably dangerous.' 2 The jury held all defend-
ants liable and awarded damages to the plaintiff in the action.' 3
On appeal, an issue raised by the defendant manufacturer, Put-
nam, provides insight into how Nebraska courts deal with the issue of
causation, particularly in the narrow area of a concurrent omission.
Putnam, the manufacturer, contended that the trial court abused
its discretion in not allowing Putnam's counsel to state in his closing
argument that the evidence established that even if a warning had
been given by Putnam, it would not have been read or heeded by the
auctioneer assistants.i
4
Essentially, the manufacturer's argument was reflective of this
narrowly defined area of causation where two or more negligent omis-
sions result in injury or damage. Putnam would have been exonerated
of liability by successfully arguing that the failure of the auctioneer
assistants to read any possible warning preempted Putnam's failure
to provide the warning. It could argue that, even though Putnam may
have been negligent in not providing an adequate warning, the auc-
tioneer assistants would not have read it anyway, and the accident
would still have occurred. Therefore, the plaintiff could not have
proven the element of causation as to Putnam.i5
However, upon closer examination, it does not take long to deter-
mine that the contrary is also true. The estate and auctioneers could
also have relied on the plaintiffs inability to meet the burden of proof
on causation as to the estate and the auctioneers. The auctioneers
could have argued that regardless of whether their employees read the
warning or not, the fact that the warning was not there caused the
injury. If the employees had read the warning, the accident still
would have happened because the label did not appropriately address
the importance of having all threads on the shank engaged. Thus,
both negligent defendants are able to point at the other and say "but
12. Id. at 179-80, 589 N.W.2d at 326-27.
13. Id. at 180, 589 N.W.2d at 327.
14. Id. at 181, 589 N.W.2d at 327.
15. To recover under a claim of strict liability a plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that
(1) the defendant placed the product on the market for use and knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the product
would be used without inspection for defects; (2) the product was in a
defective condition when it was placed on the market and left the defend-
ant's possession; (3) the defect is the proximate cause or proximately
contributing cause of the plaintiffs injury sustained while the product
was being used in a way and for the general purpose for which it was
designed and intended; (4) the defect, if existent, rendered the product
unreasonably dangerous and unsafe for its intended use; and (5) the
plaintiffs damages were a direct and proximate result of the alleged
defect.
Id. at 182-83, 589 N.W.2d at 328 (quoting Kudlacek v. Fiat S.pA, 244 Neb. 822,
509 N.W.2d 603 (1994)).
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for" the other's negligent act, the injury would not have occurred. If a
court accepts this strict view of causation, an innocent plaintiff is left
without redress.
So how did the trial court choose to deal with the particularly plex-
ing issue of causation that potentially could have exonerated all de-
fendants in Haag v. Bongers? The trial court refused to exonerate the
manufacturer and held all defendants liable.16 But, this was not ac-
complished under a causation analysis. Due to the limited standard of
review on appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision.' 7 However, had the issue of causation been more
closely addressed at trial, the direction of the court's thoughts con-
cerning the liability of the parties may have been different.
Holding all defendants liable and placing the burden on each to
exonerate himself may be an effective state of the world in Nebraska.
The Nebraska Supreme Court accepts the premise that it was defend-
ant Putnam's obligation to present evidence that the warnings would
not have been read.' 8 Putnam asserted the record reflected that a
warning would not have been read, but did not put on its own evidence
to support it.19
Requiring the defendant to prove that the warning would not have
been read in order to be relieved of liability is supported by the Second
Circuit in Liriano v. Hobart Corporation.20 In Liriano, Judge Cala-
bresi held that
[w]hen a defendant's negligent act is deemed wrongful precisely because it has
a strong propensity to cause the type of injury that ensued, that very causal
tendency is evidence enough to establish a prima facie case of cause-in-fact.
The burden then shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence that
its negligence was not such a but-for-cause.
2 1
Calabresi's idea of placing the burden on the manufacturer demon-
strates the reality that manufacturers are often unable to accomplish
this proof and are not relieved of liability. It is difficult for a manufac-
turer to prove in a court of law that even if a warning had been pro-
vided it would not have been read.
The facts of Liriano are similar to the facts of Haag. In Liriano,
the plaintiff was severely injured during the course of employment
when his hand was caught in a meat grinder. The employer had re-
moved the attached safety guard, but at issue was whether a warning
should have been affixed to the machine to indicate that the grinder
should be operated only with a safety guard attached.2 2 The defend-
16. See Haag v. Bongers, 256 Neb. 170, 194, 589 N.W.2d 318, 334 (1999).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 186, 589 N.W.2d at 330.
19. See id.
20. 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1998).
21. Id. at 271.
22. See id. at 269.
1999] 929
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ant argued that the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the
defendant's failure to place a warning on the machine was causally
related to his injury. 23 But, the Second Circuit noted that this bur-
den, in fact, was on the defendant and not the plaintiff. "[I]n a case
like this, it is up to the defendant to bring in evidence tending to rebut
the strong inference, arising from the accident, that the defendant's
negligence was in fact a but-for cause of the plaintiff's injury."
2 4
The difference in Liriano is one of form, not substance. Liriano
does not involve the concurrent negligence of two defendants, but
rather the issue of a negligent defendant and the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff. The Nebraska Supreme Court, seemingly with-
out much hesitation, has applied the theory that the burden of proof is
on the defendant.2 5 It seems that the premise adopted by Judge Cala-
bresi in the Second Circuit and the Nebraska Supreme Court in Haag
v. Bongers is tightly reasoned, easily applicable, and firmly grounded
in policy allowing for the relief of an innocent plaintiff.
III. SETTING THE STAGE FOR A CONCURRENT
OMISSION DISCUSSION
What Haag provides is an insight into how the issue of causation
can be dealt with when the omissions of two negligent defendants cre-
ate a set of circumstances where an innocent plaintiff is unable to
prove "but for" causation. "Causation" is often discussed by academics
and practitioners as an area lacking concrete principles and gui-
dance.2 6 As a result, courts deal with the issue of causation differ-
ently depending on the fact pattern they face in the pending case.
Although a situation involving a concurrent omission seems rare, the
consequences of the causation analysis in these cases should be care-
fMlly considered because the application may become readily applica-
ble in a number of other situations.
There is limited information on the way courts deal with this nar-
row illustration, but discussion among academics is prolific. The fol-
lowing is a brief summary of some of the academic views, followed by
an analysis of the relevant case law.
23. See id. at 271.
24. Id.; see also Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 nn.6-7, 390-91 (2d Cir.
1998).
25. See Haag v. Bongers, 256 Neb. 170, 185, 589 N.W.2d 318, 330 (1999).
26. In fact, the RESTATEMENT (THuw) OF TORTS is currently underway in this area
with particular scrutiny being given to the ways in which courts have dealt with
the "substantial factor" requirement of the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND). See, e.g.,
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 69 (1975); David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in
Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 1335; David W. Robertson, The Common
Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEx. L. Ray. 1765 (1997); Richard W. Wright, Causa-
tion in Tort Law, 73 CALn. L. REV. 1735 (1985).
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A. Academic Views
In The Common Sense of Cause in Fact,27 David Robertson dis-
cusses alternative approaches to cause in fact in an attempt to define
a user-friendly application for lawyers, law students and academics.
One approach Robertson discusses involves an analysis of how to han-
dle causation in the marginal cases (the focus of this note) involving
concurrent omissions and the nonuse or misuse of defective or missing
safety devices. He describes these situations using a case that exem-
plifies the hypothetical involving defendant X and defendant Y, where
both have negligently failed to act in a specific way, causing injury to
an innocent plaintiff.28 Both omissions, or negligent acts, are inde-
pendently sufficient to cause the plaintiffs injury. Therefore, both de-
fendants can argue that their conduct was not the necessary cause
(the "but for" cause) of the accident. How a court characterizes each
defendant's behavior is determinative of where liability falls in the
plaintiffs cause of action.
Robertson asserts that the most convincing approach to a situation
where each defendant's wrongful conduct keeps the other's from be-
coming operative "is to recognize the destruction of a personal injury
lawsuit as an actionable harm."2 9 He states that neither the "but for"
or "substantial factor" test provides a sufficient solution to this prob-
lem of causation. He asserts that "the substantial factor approach to
the bad brakes case does not seem very satisfactory because too many
jurors would say that neither defendant's omission was a substantial
factor in producing the plaintiffs injuries."30
However, contrary to what Robertson states, the assertion could
also be made that a jury may find that a defendant is not the "but for"
cause of the plaintiffs injuries but still intuitively find that the de-
fendant's actions substantially contributed to those injuries, thereby
allocating liability. Both assertions are merely speculative and un-
supported by documented jury patterns.
Robertson finds support for his theory of liability based on the de-
struction or impairment of the plaintiffs case against the other
tortfeasor from Prosser's comment in The Law of Torts.31 Prosser ad-
dressed two cases involving two negligent defendants, each preventing
the other from being a cause of injury. Although Prosser states that
"it may be said with some confidence that if any such case is consid-
ered, both parties will be held liable; but the theory of liability is not
27. Robertson, supra note 2.
28. See, e.g., Saunders Sys. Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 117 So. 72 (Ala. 1928).
29. Robertson, supra note 2, at 1787.
30. I&
31. WnLIA L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF TORTS § 41, 239-40 n.25 (4th ed.
1971).
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so clear,"3 2 he adds an additional comment that "[plerhaps the best
guess is that each, by his negligence, has deprived the plaintiff of a
cause of action against the other, and so should be liable."33
However, in the fifth edition, Posser deletes such commentary and
states only that neither case cited considers the point of whether the
negligence of one prevents the other from being a but-for cause.3 4 For
some reason, the feasibility of maintaining a cause of action for "de-
priving a plaintiff of a cause of action against the other" was lost in the
updating, possibly because it was too academic for practical
purposes.3 5
Intuitively, Robertson allocates liability among both defendants.
Robertson concludes that by treating as actionable the destruction of
the plaintiffs case against the other tortfeasor, both defendants could
be liable in a potential personal injury action, thereby eliminating the
problematic cause in fact issue and providing relief to an innocent
plaintiff.36
In Causation in Tort Law,3 7 Richard Wright takes a different ap-
proach to this illustration. He begins by examining how Leon
Green,3 8 and Becht and Miller 39 approach this problem as a basis for
unfolding his own theory of the "Necessary Element of a Sufficient
Set" Test ("NESS")40 which relieves defendant X from liability.
Wright asserts Leon Green's conclusion that defendant X, by sup-
plying the defective safety device, is liable for any injuries inflicted on
others by defendant Y, who failed to use the device at all, "because
presumably [Y] would not have been driving if [X had told him about
the defective brakes."41 But, Wright feels that the analysis under
Green's duty-risk theory is "a causal (but for') argument masquerad-
ing as a duty issue."4 2
Becht and Miller come closer to Wright's theory by looking specifi-
cally at the defendant's tortious conduct. However, according to
Wright, their approach "requires that the tortious act or omission
have been a necessary condition for one of the positive (actual) causal
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41,
267 n.27 (5th ed. 1984).
35. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 1788.
36. See id. at 1787.
37. Wright, supra note 26.
38. Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543
(1962).
39. AR~o L. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLI-
GENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961).
40. See Wright, supra note 26, at 1788.
41. Id. at 1762 (basing his analysis on Green's own resolution in The Causal Relation
Issue in Negligence Law.
42. Id.
932 [Vol. 78:925
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sequences that contributed to the injury."4 3 As a result, Wright as-
serts that they would be forced to deny that causation exists in the
defective safety device scenario because neither omission was a neces-
sary condition in producing the injury.44
In support of his own NESS (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set)
test, Wright asserts that defendant Y's failure to use the brakes is a
preemptive cause of the plaintiffs injuries thereby relieving X of lia-
bility. He comes to this conclusion by defining each defendant's con-
duct in terms of whether it is a necessary element of any set of
antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of
the injury.4 5 By narrowly defining the conditions necessary for the
injury, Wright successfully relieves defendant X from liability. "[Y's]
failure to try to use the brakes was necessary for the sufficiency of a
set of actual antecedent conditions that did not include [X's] failure to
repair the brakes, and the sufficiency of this set was not affected by
[X's] failure to repair the brakes."46 However, the fine distinctions
made by Wright have been criticized as inapplicable and circular in
application.4 7
David Fischer provides his own analysis of the illustrated problem
by finding a close analogy between the defective safety device cases
and other types of concurring-omission cases, such as New York Cen-
tral Railroad v. Grimstad48 and product liability failure-to-warn
cases. Interestingly, he discovers similarities with cases involving sit-
uations "where an inadequate warning was given and the user did not
read it, or in which no warning was given but it appeared the user
would not have read and followed a warning had one been supplied."49
In this ... category of cases, ... courts have not recognized the presence of the
multiple-sufficient-cause problem. Courts resolve these cases in a number of
ways.
One line of cases requires plaintiff to show that a proper warning would
have prevented the accident by altering the user's behavior. These cases ex-
onerate the manufacturer on the ground that the failure to warn did not cause
the accident because the warning was not read. Some cases appear to do so on
the basis of the but-for test. Others find, without analysis, that the accident
was caused by the failure to read the label or manual. They do not appear to
recognize that application of the but-for test does not support this result.5 0
43. Id. at 1787 (providing an analysis of BECHT & MLLER, supra note 39).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1801.
46. Id.
47. See Fischer, supra note 26, at 1359 (stating that "in multiple-omission cases, the
NESS test can be manipulated to produce differing results" and "is helpful only in
rationalizing results made on unarticulated bases; it is not helpful in reaching
the results).
48. 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920).
49. Fischer, supra note 26, at 1352.
50. Id. at 1353-54 (footnotes omitted).
1999]
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Fischer's intuition in allocating liability in the concurrent omission
cases is to hold both negligent defendants liable in the interest of cor-
rective justice: "[C]orrective justice can often be achieved by imposing
liability in multiple-sufficient-omission cases. Neither temporal se-
quence, lack of independent sufficiency, nor lack of a second wrong-
doer provides a sufficient basis for exonerating a culpable wrongdoer
at the expense of an innocent plaintiff."5l
B. Case Law
Only a few courts have dealt with situations where multiple, suffi-
cient causes impair a plaintiffs cause of action. The most notorious
case is Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams.52 Saunders pro-
vides the basic fact pattern most academics analyze. In Saunders, the
defendant rented a car, with allegedly defective brakes, to a driver,
who allegedly traveled at an excessive rate of speed and failed to ade-
quately apply brakes. The plaintiff was injured as a result. The court
held that if the jury determined excessive speed was the proximate
cause of the accident, the rental agency was in no way liable to the
plaintiff because its negligence in providing defective brakes did not
cause the accident.5 3 The court did not specifically address the multi-
ple-sufficient cause issue.
Rouleau v. Blotner54 is also often cited. Rouleau is a case, similar
to Saunders, where the court exonerated the first negligent defendant
on the basis of preempted causation. In Rouleau, the defendant negli-
gently failed to use a signal when he made a left turn in front of the
plaintiff, who approached along with oncoming traffic. As a result, the
plaintiff stopped in traffic, causing injuries. It was determined that
the plaintiff would not have seen the signal anyway and its absence
was no ground for complaint. The plaintiffs negligence in failing to
maintain proper lookout was deemed the proximate cause of the
injuries. 55
Alternatively, the court in Sears v. Interurban Transportation
Co.56 found no reason to relieve the defendant of liability when the
51. Id. at 1381.
52. 117 So. 72 (Ala. 1928).
53. See id. at 73-74.
54. 152 A. 916 (N.H. 1931).
55. See id.; see also Eklof v. Waterston, 285 P. 201 (Or. 1930) where the court re-
versed a judgment against a rental corporation for negligently providing defective
brakes on a rented vehicle because the proof showed that the direct and proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiffs injury was the negligent driving of the bailee. When
the bailee accelerated the vehicle to avoid hitting a streetcar, he ran over a curb
and into a fire hydrant that was thrown against the plaintiff. The condition of the
brakes was found to be, at most, only a condition or circumstance surrounding
the accident.
56. 125 So. 748 (La. Ct. App. 1930).
[Vol. 78:925
CONCURRENT OMISSION
plaintiff, who was driving defendant's car at an allegedly reckless
speed, swerved down a hill to avoid hitting a parked car. The plaintiff
went over an embankment and was injured.5 7 Plaintiff attributed the
accident to a faulty steering gear and the defendant pled contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff.5 8 However, in this case, the
defendant had knowledge of the possible defect in the steering column
and failed to notify the plaintiff when the plaintiff offered to drive.59
The evidence clearly indicated the condition of the car caused the acci-
dent. "[Wlhen the negligence of defendant is shown, the fact that a
third person was also guilty of negligence which contributed to the
injury of the plaintiff, will not relieve the defendant from liability for
its negligence." 60 Unlike the plaintiffs in Saunders and Rouleau, the
plaintiff in Sears attempted to use the defective device and the evi-
dence supported the allegation that it was faulty.
As illustrated by these cases, courts tend to exonerate the first act-
ing defendant and have held the negligent party, who was closer in
temporal proximity to the accident or injury, liable. Regardless of
whether it is one plaintiff against two negligent defendants or
whether the plaintiffs contributory negligence is at issue, the court's
intuition seems to be that the negligent act most removed is not the
"cause." However, the courts fail to recognize the possibility based on
their concurrent omissions analysis that both parties could potentially
be exonerated.
In assimilating the defective safety device cases with cases against
manufacturers for failure to warn, David Fischer demonstrates how
courts differ in how they deal with the issue of causation.6 ' In some
failure to warn cases, the courts have required that the plaintiff show
that if a proper warning had been provided their behavior as the prod-
uct user would have been affected and injury avoided. These cases
exonerate the manufacturer "on the ground that the failure to warn
did not cause the accident because the warning was not read."6 2
In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Baker, for example, a manufacturer sold a prefabri-
cated fireplace with unreasonably confusing installation instructions. The
manufacturer wrote an addendum clarifying the instructions, but failed to
provide it to the buyer. The buyer hired a carpenter with a sixth grade educa-
tion to install the fireplace. He installed it improperly without reading most
of the instructions provided, and the improper installation caused a fire in the
buyer's home. The buyer sued both the manufacturer and the carpenter. The
court held the manufacturer not liable for failing to provide the addendum to
57. See id. at 749.
58. See id. at 749-50.
59. See id. at 750.
60. Id. at 751-52.
61. See supra note 47.
62. See Fischer, supra note 26, at 1353 & n.76.
1999]
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the instructions. It ruled that the absence of the clarifying instructions did
not cause the accident since the carpenter would not have read them.63
Fischer finds that some cases appear to exonerate the manufac-
turer defendant on the basis of the but-for test although the courts do
not expressly state they are utilizing such a test.6 4
Other courts exonerate the manufacturer without any analysis at
all and find that the injury was caused by the failure to read the label
or manual.65 What is consistent in Fischer's analysis, though, is that
the manufacturer is exonerated. This premise does not prevail in
Nebraska.
IV. ANALYSIS
The sequential omissions of two negligent defendants interacting
to create a situation where an innocent plaintiff is unable to meet the
burden of proving causation under the "but for" analysis parallels
cases where concurrent acts have created an identical problem. 6 6 As
between an innocent plaintiff and two negligent defendants, the plain-
tiff must not be left without redress because the factual context makes
it impossible to prove causation.6 7 Allowing recovery for an innocent
plaintiff, who cannot meet the burden on causation due to the circum-
stances created by the defendant's negligence, has become rooted in
the tort system and serves as the backdrop for a proposed solution to
the stated hypothetical and focus of this note.
In a concurrent omission case, the plaintiff should recover, just as
in related cases where the courts have made a policy choice, for one
reason or another, to allow an innocent plaintiff to recover.
In Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,6S two fires merged destroying
the plaintiffs property. The plaintiff could not show "but for" causa-
tion because the identity of the cause of only one fire was known and it
could not be said that "but for" one of the fires, the other wouldn't have
occurred. Joint and several liability could not apply with only one
known tortfeasor. By shifting the burden to the known defendant to
prove they did not cause the loss, the court crafted a narrow rule to
63. Id. at 1354.
64. See id. (citing E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963 (Ala. 1985) (holding
stronger warning on package would not have prevented harm because plaintiff
would not have read it) and Cobb Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Hertron
Chem. Co., 229 S.E.2d 681, 683 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (holding detailed instructions
would not have prevented fire if user did not read them)).
65. See id. at 1374 n.78 (citing McCleskey v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 193 S.E.2d
16, 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (holding failure to read label on drum of sanitizer
caused harm)).
66. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924
(Cal. 1980); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927).
67. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
68. 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927).
[Vol. 78:925936
CONCURRENT OMISSION
allow a plaintiff to recover in an effort to use traditional doctrine based
on policy grounds.
In Summers v. Tice,69 two hunters simultaneously shot their guns
resulting in an injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff could not prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that either defendant's shot caused
the injury.70 But, both defendants acted negligently, and it was obvi-
ous that one of them caused the injury. The court shifted the burden
of proof regarding causation to the negligent parties. The shooters
then bore the burden of the unusual facts that prevented the plaintiff
from establishing its case.7 1 The innocent party then received the
benefit of the situation created by the defendants. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts adopted the court's holding in Summers. Where a
small number of defendants have engaged in substantially simultane-
ous culpable conduct imposing similar risks on the victim, the burden
may shift and they may be held as joint tortfeasors if none can excul-
pate himself.72 They must, however, all be joined in the lawsuit.
The same policy choice went into the holding in Sindell v. Abbott
Labs.73 In Sindell, the plaintiffs mother ingested the drug DES while
she was pregnant. As a result of her mother's taking the drug the
plaintiff was injured and she sued the manufacturers of the drug. The
court stated that once the plaintiff established a defendant manufac-
turer's culpability in making and marketing the drug at the time of
her mother's ingestion, the defendant had the burden of proving it was
not a supplier of the particular DES ingested by the plaintiffs
mother.7 4 If the defendant was unable to disprove causation, it was
liable for its percent of market share at the time the mother was
exposed. 7 5
Likewise, in Corey v. Havener,76 two defendants on motorcycles
passed the plaintiffs horse, one on each side, and so frightened the
horse because of their speed, noise, and smoke, that the horse ran
away, thereby injuring the plaintiff.7 7 In Corey, the plaintiff recov-
ered from both defendants despite the obvious probability that either
motorcycle alone would have produced the result, and the fact that
each was sued separately (the actions were tried together).78 Even
though Corey involved simultaneous actions rather than actions in
temporal sequence like the concurrent omission hypothetical, the ba-
69. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
70. See id. at 4.
71. See id. at 5.
72. See RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B(3).
73. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
74. See id. at 936.
75. See id. at 937.
76. 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902).
77. See id
78. See id.
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sic premise of tort law prevails: compensating the innocent plaintiff
based on a narrowly crafted rule of causation. "Where both causes
involve the wrongful acts of legally responsible human beings there is
virtual unanimity among courts in holding both (or either) liable for
the whole injury ... "79
What all of these similar cases establish is that courts are willing
to narrowly craft a rule, under unique circumstances, so that an inno-
cent plaintiff is justifiably able to recover for injuries created by negli-
gent defendants.
In the concurrent omission hypothetical, both defendants are negli-
gent. The concurrent omission hypothetical is different, however, in
that the shifting of the burden does not add anything to the equation.
In the concurrent omission hypothetical, it is apparent that the indi-
vidual, whose negligence was last in the chain of events by failing to
apply the brakes at all, should be held responsible in some form for
the plaintiffs injuries. That is the intuitive response demonstrated in
the cases discussed in Part III.B. of this note. The question is whether
the first negligent actor should benefit from having a subsequent neg-
ligent defendant in control of the already defective instrumentality?
The answer is clearly "no." Temporal positioning of negligence should
not relieve either party of liability in this situation.
Calabresi's approach of shifting the burden to the defendant in a
failure to warn situation does not help in this situationSo because the
negligence of both defendants is determined, and either omission by
itself is sufficient to bring about the result. Therefore, the point of
requiring defendants to prove they were not the cause is moot. Some
may argue that it is not certain that if the driver had attempted to use
the brakes, they would have failed or that the driver would have had
the wherewithal to attempt to steer better, maintain better focus and
use of their own faculties, etc. Even if such a premise is adopted
(although the defective instrumentality strongly suggests certain in-
jury), the courts' decisions in failure to warn cases demonstrate that
the first negligent actor is not so easily exonerated. Uncertainty al-
ways exists in the area of causation.
In traditional court cases, plaintiff must show "but for" a defend-
ant's act, this injury would not have occurred. This requires hypothe-
sizing an omission. The posed hypothetical involving a concurrent
omission only raises the opposite analysis and the plaintiff must hy-
pothesize an act. The analysis is identical to the "but for" test used
every day but it is seemingly counter-intuitive.
Calabresi's Liriano holding, shifting the burden of the manufac-
turer to prove that the warning would not have been read, demon-
79. 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF ToRTs § 20.3, at 114-15 (2d ed. 1986).
80. See supra notes 20-24.
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strates that manufacturers in these cases are often not relieved of
liability. It is difficult to prove that if a warning had been provided,
the consumer would have read the warning and heeded its cautionary
language. Therefore, in reality, manufacturers are often held liable.
Holding the manufacturers liable reflects the deep-rooted principal
that when an innocent plaintiff is unable to meet the burden on causa-
tion due to the circumstances created by negligent defendants, alloca-
tion of liability should be apportioned between both defendants. This
occurs when it is clear that the defendants' negligence contributed in
some way to the accident even though the technical requirements of
"but for" causation are not met.
Relieving the first negligent actor in a concurrent omission case is
not a desirable result under the established case law policy. There-
fore, shifting the burden to the first negligent actor to prove that, even
if the instrumentality had been effective the injury would have oc-
curred, is not sound policy. In fact, burden shifting makes it even
more likely in a concurrent omission fact pattern that the first actor
could exonerate himself. Because the driver did, in fact, injure the
plaintiff, the first negligent actor (the rental agency) would be able to
exonerate himself every time. That result does not follow the estab-
lished theory of how courts deal with the negligence of multiple
defendants. 81
Because shifting the burden of proof in the concurrent omission hy-
pothetical is not of much use, Fischer's analysis to products liability
and failure to warn cases may not be helpful.s2 However, these cases
demonstrate a useful recovery scheme, more prevalent in the case law,
to test the unique situation of concurrent omission.
Both defendants, if they are simultaneously present in the cause of
action, should be liable to the injured plaintiff. Comparative liability
has been devised in our court system to handle just this situation. Let
the fact-finder apply its own intuition in allocating liability. It seems
fair that both defendants should equally bear the burden in this situa-
tion. The first negligent actor should not be exonerated solely because
of the way things played out.
The Summers court was willing to hold both defendants liable.83
This demonstrates the strong position taken by the court in shifting
the burden of causation to the defendants. At that time, each defend-
ant could have potentially been independently liable for the total
amount of damages. The trend has now moved away from applying
joint and several liability where the inclusion of any one defendant
could mean sole responsibility for the entire judgment. As a result, it
81. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text (discussing cases dealing with the
issue of causation and multiple negligent defendants).
82. See supra Part IIlA.
83. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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is more reasonable to apply comparative liability where the most prob-
able result would be a fifty/fifty split of liability between the negligent
defendants.
There is no need, as Robertson attempts, to recognize the destruc-
tion of a personal injury lawsuit as an actionable harm.8 4 His intui-
tion is right-it is too academic for practical purposes and quite
frankly, not necessary to achieve the intuitive result. One case given
to the jury can establish that given these circumstances, as between
an innocent plaintiff and two negligent defendants concurrently omit-
ting a specific act, both defendants are liable for plaintiffs injuries. It
is one possible intuitive response.
One defendant should not be exonerated on the basis of a proxi-
mate cause analysis. Courts have to draw a line to limit liability.
"Legal cause" gives them the language necessary to accomplish the
limitation in a cause of action. By imposing liability on both defend-
ants the courts are reflecting society's intuition that justice for the in-
nocent plaintiff outweighs the cost of shifting the burden to the two,
negligent defendants.
It is inevitable that an arbitrary line will be drawn and courts do
not like to do it blatantly. Accordingly, it is rational to assert, in a
situation of concurrent omissions, that both defendants are liable for
their negligent actions. This result encourages socially useful behav-
ior in the future. It is clear that Y driver will most certainly exercise
safer judgment while driving. X rental agency, on the other hand, will
not be encouraged to change his behavior, but will certainly have the
same incentive to provide a safe product because nothing will relieve
him of liability if he is negligent, including the coincidental negligence
of the person in control of the instrumentality.
V. CONCLUSION
The hypothetical situation involving the misuse or nonuse of a de-
fective safety device has been alternatively described as multiple-suffi-
cient causes, duplicative or preemptive causes and concurring
omissions. It involves a very narrow area of case law that deals with
two or more negligent omissions resulting in injury or damage.
Although many opinions have been advanced on how such cases are
best handled, the answers are largely intuitive and based on whom
the courts believe to be largely responsible. The early cases exhibit
the courts' tendency to exonerate the first negligent defendant thereby
placing liability on the defendant closer in temporal sequence. The
academics, on the other hand, intuitively allocate liability among both
negligent defendants. However, if the courts took a broader approach
to the issue of causation in concurrent omission cases, they would see
84. See Robertson, supra note 2.
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that the "but for" analysis is not always as apparent. While the tradi-
tional "but for" test is usually successful in allocating liability, in the
context of concurring omissions, it unexpectedly exonerates each neg-
ligent defendant.
At the core of this debate lies the foundation of our tort system.
The intuitive responses to the concurrent omission fact pattern pro-
vide an insight into the belief of each individual's view of how the tort
system should compensate victims. If viewed from the practical
standpoint of existing case law and domparative negligence standards,
allocating liability among both negligent defendants in a concurrent
omission fact pattern is the common sense approach.
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